NATURE AND OTHER
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JOSE PH MEEKER
Seattle, washingt:.cn
There is good agreement am:mg the people
of various ti.rres and cultures concerning the
basic elements present in the world.
In
nature there are celestial J:xxlies and rrovements, weather, plants and animals, and the
land and water of the earth's surface.
In
htmliID affairs there are families, problems of
food and reproduction, social and political
structures, and experiences of unseen realities of an errotional, spiritual, or religious
sort.
There are males and females, strong
and weak individuals, birth, sickness, and
death, as well as love, joy, and pleasure.
Cultural m::xlels agree well in their inventories of the world's significant canp:>nents,
but they vary greatly in their assessrrent of
the relationships arrong these components.
Every culture finds its awn m::xlel of organization for them.

We have ccrne to accept the notion that
there are lower forms of life and higher
forms.
Even biologists testify to the validity of the chain and use its terminology in
their laboratories and professional writings.
The fX1ylogenetic scale canes out of Plato and
Aristotle by way of Linnaeus, and it is nicely consistent with other versions of the
Chain of Being.
Scientists who would never
think of experimenting upon htmliID beings at
the upper end of the scale are perfectly
oontent to carve, drug, torture, oonfine, and
redesign animals lCMer on the scale because
their status allCM5 them no rroral rights to
life, liberty, or to the pursuit of their own
destinies.

I do not mean to suggest that hierarchical m::xlels are solely the invention of Western culture, although it does seem that the
West has institutionalized and internalized
such m::xlels rrore thoroughly than other peopies.
The Confucian tradition of China, for
instance, is a thorough-going hierarchical
m::xlel of social order based upon status roles
in the htmliID family and extended to political
and ethical structures.
Hindu social order
is also rigidly and notoriously hierarchical.
Even the Hopi Indians have a kind of inverted
scale which places highest value upon those
things closest to the earth, which is why the
Hopi worship in underground kivas with the
spiritual leader situated at a lCMer elevation than his atrlience.
And, as has been
learned only recently, many animals are socially organized acoording to status roles
oonferred by birth, behavior, or gender.
Abundance evidence suggests that hierarchies
are, in fact, principles of nature and that
status within them defines an individual's
rights and responsibilities.

A favorite m::xlel of organization within
Western culture has been the hierarchical
scheme which arranges all elements of reality
according to a vertical scale of sane sort.
Anyone who has suffered education in our
culture ]mCMS that every part of the standard
curriculum is infonned by hierarchical criteria,
both as the objects of study and as
the methods for sttrlying.
The influences of
this persistent m::xlel of reality are all
around us: in philosofX1ical systems, literary forms,
social institutions, political
structures, educational organizations, scientific systems of classification, and in the
laws and custans governing human behavior.
Wherever the Chain of Being has been
applied, it has been asst.nned that value increases at each higher notch upon the scale.
"IDwer" forms of existence are always less
important than "higher" forms.
Further, the
status of every element upon the vertical
scale defines the rights that i t enjoys. God
possesses all rights, while stones have none
at all. Those of us who are neither gods nor
rocks llU1st be oontent with an intennediate
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status and limited rights, with sane things
possible for us and others impossible.
All
animals, incltrling
creatures.

humans,

1984 by Joseph Meeker

are such middle
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Natural hierarchies are nornally fOtUld
only within given groups of conspecifics.
'!be rank-order in a IOOngoose colony applies
only to members of that colony, and it does
not even affect neighboring colonies of IOOngooses, let alone other species living in the
same area.
Humans alone have imagined that
they p::>ssess a species status which elevates

=eature she has often been thought to be.
addition to giving birth, ~sU19 children, and keeping house, waren also experience canplex states of consciousness and are
fully capable of urrlerstanding and of creating intellectual, spiritual, and a..-tlstic experiences of a high order.
Wanen can be
quite as responsible before the world as men
and are no longer likely to be content merely
to serve the interests of individual men or
those of a collective of male-dan:inated s0ciety.
In

them above other species.
We are remarkable
annng animals because of our attempts to live
according to an imaginary interspecies daninance hierarchy.
other animals, of course,
do knot know about the relative status they
have been assigned in our system; so, they
continue to disa~int us by ignoring our
rules.

Tradi tional IOOral categories also fail
to agree with what is now known about nature
and has always been known about wanen.
The
seductiveness and seductability of Eve are no
IOOre typical of wanen than are the spirituali ty and ~ity of Mary.
Like men, waren are
capable of both corruption and ccrnpassion and
of the many gradations of hate and affection,
deception and honesty, selfishness and altruism which make up the IOOral rep::>rtoire of
humanity.
Neither the top nor the bottan of
a hierarchical IOOral scale is a suitable
niche for wanan, though she has seldan been
allowed any other choices.
In the same way,
nature has been jooged to be either fundamentally evil or divinely perfect.
Pastoral
scenes of IOOral perfection are no IOOre accurate about nature than are the grisly scenes
of brutality imagined by Social Darwinists
who interpret "survival of the fittest" as if
it referred to a gigantic Darwinian Donnybrook.
Neither nature nor wanan is inherently evil, nor inherently pure.

Confusion is bound to occur when a pattern of dominance developed within one species is extended to inclooe all species. One
of the clearest examples of the problem is
evident in the relative status of male and
female human beings, which has long been
mixed up in our minds with the relative status of mankind as a whole and nature as a
whole.
Wanen and nature have occupied virtually
the same status in the traditional structures
of mythology, pililic imagery, fXti.losofily, and
law. Whatever may be conceived of as "rights
of nature" in any given period are likely to

be consistent, if not identical, with that
period I S conception of "the rights of wanen."
It is not merely coincidental that a renewed
interest in the rights of natural environments should occur simultaneously with a
massive social effort to redefine the rights
and status of wanen.
For, as nature is
thought of by ma.nk.i.nd, so will wanen be
thought of by men.
As humans conceive the
roles and rights of nature, so will men conceive the roles and rights of waren.

I t is also untrue that undeveloped land
and wanen ImlSt be managed by men in order to
achiever their full p::>tentials, though our
laws and custans persist in this assumption.
Wilderness land supports IOOre life and achieves rrore ecological elegance than farms
can ever know, and with better prospects for
stability and future growth.
Land manages
itself better than bureaus of land management
can.
Similarly,
shrews--....hether two- or
four-legged--can fulfill their lives without
being tam:rl by men, especially if taming has
no better p.rrpose than to affinn male power.
Wanen and wilderness have alike been forced
to sutmit to male management "for their own
good" but to the loss of their inherent integrities.

Nei ther nature nor wanan is as simple as
both have been been assurred to be in IOOst
hierarchical schemes. Nature is not merely a
garden provided for mankind I S nourishment and
canfort, but a canplex system with a capacity
to encourage many fonns of life other than
human forms.
Humans are one species of the
several million whose intricate relationships
constitute what we think of as "nature." To
asSUIre that the system of nature is simpler
than one of its canponent parts--humanity-was never reasonable, and it has now becane
canpletely absurd in the light of the ecological knowledge of nature I s cx::mplexity.
Si milarly, wanan no longer seems the simple
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

Power has traditionally grown out of the
barrel of a penis.
Rigid male machines poke
at the earth pretending to fertilize it,
heedless of the destruction of delicate tis-
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presents physical existence, and metafhysics
helps to transcend her.
Yet her image and
her environs often inspire men toward SplrlSplrl
tual achievement.
She represents fertility
when she is properly cultivated and death or
danger when she is permitted to remain wild.
Taming her is man's task on earth, the fulful
fillment of which affirms his maleness.
She
is a prize to be won by males in battle, and
she is a source of male repose when the
battle has been won.
She was provided by a
male god to be man's servant.
Her influence
tempts man to sin and inspires him to his
salvation. Such mix-and-match metafhors have
provided Western
western culture with a unified way
to think about woman and nature and to reguregu
late the status and rights of both.
A concon
sistent axiom of our culture affirms that
nature is to mankind as women are to men.

sues. Possessing nature is the entertainment
of all-male gangs of engineers, m:mntaineers,
miners and frontiersmen who leave their wanen
at hane when they set out, weapons at the
ready, to ravish ~ther Nature. Ostensibly,
the girls are left behind to spare them dandan
ger, but the mutual admiration typical of men
in such gangs is enough to explain why the
conquest of nature has been ITOstly a mascumascu
line sport. Nature is the wanan men ITOunt in
plblic to display their prowess before one
another, while wives are screwed at hane to
affirm male supremacy over females.
A screw
is an engineering device used to hold things
in place.
Nature has been assumed to exist only to
serve humanity's needs, just as woman exists
to serve man's. Both have been thought of as
camodities, resources to be mined.
Adam
received daninion over nature and over Eve,
both gifts of Go::l. From the raw materials of
nature and wanan, Adam was supposed to fafa
shion heaven using his male tools.
So, his
descendants pla.red the earth, and they plowed
their wives, for both were properties needing
improvement before their benefits could be
realized.
As Rene Dubas once put it,
"Man
can manipulate nature to his best interests
only if he first loves her for her own
sake" [1] --as if there were no contradiction
between love and profitable manipulation.

A revolution has begun which challenges
the traditional status accorded to women and
to nature. Both have been canpromised beyond
their endurance and made to bear unbearable
burdens.
Water and air have accepted enorenor
rrous quantities of humanity's poisons, and
now they have begun to kill us with our own
contaminants.
They do so incidentally and
without malice; nature is merely announcing
that it can take no more of our crap.
That
is also rrodern woman's message to men, but
women speak from a reservoir of anger that is
unknown to nature.
Women are capable of
revenge as the ecosfhere is not.
From both
sources, the message is increasingly clear:
the world is not well served by a hierarchy
that relegates natural processes and females
to subordinate levels with no rights to propro
tect them from abuse.

Exploitation is not the only purpose
guiding wan's relation to nature and woman,
for he has also found pleasure and beauty in
both. Both have been thought of as enriching
ornaments on the bare bones of life.
Both
offer relief from rronotony and ugliness,
comfort after struggle, and the titillations
of sensual pleasure.
National parks, like
beauty queens, are set aside as inviolate
specimens and fenced from the uses of indiviindivi
dual men, so that all may ogle them equally.
Pride is also at work even in such preservapreserva
tions of pleasure, for parks and queens alike
serve as status displays proving that those
who are rich and powerful can afford to mainmain
tain beautiful and useless objects merely for
the pleasure they will provide.

I

if

Of course, Reversing the hierarchy will
not solve the problem.
It would be no imim
provement if nature were to dominate mankind
or if waren
wanen were to dominate Iren.
It is the
hierarchy itself that seems inadequate, h0wh0w
ever it my be organized.
In its place is
emerging a recognition that systems unlike
one's own must enjoy the right to fulfillment
according to their own inherent needs. Males
must begin to learn how to recognize and
respond to the genuine needs of females, just

Perhaps the simplest way to surrmarize
the conventional imagery of woman and nature
is merely to repeat a few typical sentences
in which the feminine pronoun can be indisindis

as humanity must discover how to honor the
canplex structures of natural ecology.
sta
status is no longer appropriate for the determidetermi
nation of rights, and it never was.

criminately replaced by either word:
nature
or woman.
She is corrupt, because she is
exclusively biological and, thus, incapable
of spirit or rroral responsibility.
She rere

Natural creatures do not enjoy any stasta
tus beyond that earned arrong the :i.nmedi.ate
members of their own species. \'blves are not
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superior to the rabbits they prey uIXXl or to
the envirooment they live in, fX)r do they
enjoy any special rights within their sursur
rounding ea::>systems.
A wolf's status is
fixed by cal\PE!tition with the other wolves in
its clan and is not significant beyond the
contiguous social group.
Effective group
hunting simply requires leadership and the
exercise of authority.
Fortunately, wolves
cannot elevate their status structures into
cosmic hierarchies, as people have done.

artXlllg these male and female symbols, but they
are by no means daninant.
Along with the
animals, humans take their place in a larger
sexual classification of all life forms.
Genital
and reproductive aspects of
sexuality are minor and inconsequential feafea
tures of Paleolithic art.
Male and female
are significant categories of life because of
the different values and behavior that they
represent.
'lbey stand for a world that is
ordered according to alternation, complemencomplemen
tarity, and antagonism between two principles
which occupy equal halves of a horizontal
scale.
Differential functions, rather than
differential status,
are the significant
criteria for organization.

Non-hierarchical systans of classificaclassifica
tion are worth examining.
several are aa
vailable to us fran the ancient past and fran
cultural traditions other than our 0NIl.
CA1e such system has been pieced together
fran the remains of Paleolithic art dating
between 30,000 B.C. and 10,000 B.C. PaleoliPaleoli
thic art represents ancient human values and
patterns of thought before these were nodinodi
fied by the powerful forces of agricultural
civilization and intellectual culture.
Pa
Paleolithic art .antedates agriculture and the
dcmestication of animals, and it represents a
way of life based uIXXl hunting and close
coordination between human affairs and nana
tural ecology.

Paleolithic taxonany (unlike that of
Aristotle or Linnaeus) seems to be based upon
the proposition that variations in behavior
and temperazrent are rrnre important principles
of classification than variation in anatany
and physiology.
In such a system, gender is
the guiding principle, for there are only two
large classes of life:
male and female.
Gender cuts across species lines, uniting all
creatures in a continuous scale of existence.
This proposition raises for us sane interinter
esting questions:
do male humans have llOre
in CCIl1IlOl1 with male apes than with female
humans? Is a nursing human llOther llOre simisimi
1ar to a nursing wolf llOther than to her 0NIl
husband?
Such questions seem bizarre Only
because of our long cultural addiction to
hierarchical scales based ulXXl structural
criteria. 'lbey are worth reconsidering after
thirty thousand years of neglect.

Paleolithic art is primitive only in the
sense that it is very old. It is not simple,
nor is it confined to representations of
Illlmdane activities or observed objects and
events. Rather, i t displays a subtle symbolsymbol
ic node of thought which remained consistentconsistent
ly expressive of human sensibilities for a
period of sane twenty thousand years.
'lbe
stability of this artistic tradition rested
uIXXl a dualistic, non-hierarchical system
which classified all living creatures accordaccord
ing to gender in a single symbolic scheme.

'lbe Paleolithic system of classification
can be reconstructed only by inference for
the arts and actions of ancient hunting peopeo
ples.
Although it may have been systematic
and comprehensive, it is not articulated in a
lxrly of literature or law.
If nodels of
dynamic order were to be found only in such
cultures, we would have to assume that they
are only appropriate to the circumstance of
hunting and gathering, and perhaps not apap
plicable to the refined cultures of civilized
human life.
There is at least one example,
however, of a systemic cosrrology based upon
gender symbolism developed by a highly 5050
pusticated culture that is fare fran hunting
and gathering: Chinese Taoism.

'lbere
is no Paleolithic pornograIily
displaying sexual relations between zren and
wanen. 'lbe caves are not nonuzrents to sexual
conquests, nor do they display images of
sexual fertility and voluptuousness.
Aston
Astonishingly, "there is not a single scene of
human copulation in all Paleolithic art, not
even a single instance of an i thYIilallic
figure in close proximity to a female fifi
gure."[2] There is, however, a "fundamental
principle of pairing" •
there are male
and female animal figures whose actions do
not overtly allooe to sexual reproduction,
but whose male and female qualities are inin
dispensably cunplementary. " [3]
H'lmans are

'lbe Chinese Book of Tao describes a
--- structural nodel of the world which was prepre
sent in the cultural traditions of China for
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many centuries before its articulation by Lao
Tzu around the fifth century B.C.
The concon
cept of life as a "way" (Tao) and the p:>larip:>lari
ties yin and yang were present at the earear
liest stages of recurded Chinese thought in
the third rnillenium B.C., [4] and they may
rest up:>n much older structures, like those
of Paleolithic art.
Whatever its origins,
Taoism's concepts corresp:>nd in i..rnpJrtant
ways to the implicit pulosophy of PaleoliPaleoli
thic hunting culture, and with other ancient
concepts of world order which deserve to be
re-examined in our time, as we search for a
new eculogical view of the nature of things.

over others. Instead, Taoism describes meremere
ly a process of increasing canplexity:
Tao produced the Q1e.
The Q1e produced the two.
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand
things. [7]
The "ten thousand things" inclooe all the
fonns and species of the earth, with no spespe
cial status reserved for mankind. The things
of the earth are not organized according to a
nature-man-god hierarchy, as in the Western
chain of being, but according to the balanced
p:>larity of yin and yang:

The world as described by Taoism concon
sists
essentially of processes,
not of
things.
Objects and organisms are media
through which process (Tao) becx::Koos manifest,
just as language is one medium through which
thought becanes manifest, but neither things
nor language are equivalent to the processes
which they partially represent.

The ten thousand things carry the yin
and embrace the yang, and through the
blending of the material force they
achieve hanoony. [8]
Harrrony is achieved through blending, rather
than status being achieved through conquest.
Taoism is a dynamic ethic, rather than a
rationale for triumph.

Taoist cosmology offers a model of the
world based upon modes of action and relarela
tionship which are reciprocal rather than
hierarchic.
status is not significant in
this system, for all of its essential cancan
ponents are of equal importance:

Yin and yang are female and male prinprin
ciples independent of sexual geI¥.l.er.
Like
the symbols in the caves of Paleolithic hunhun
ters, yin and yang divide the world's fonns
into two canplernentary categories according
to their modes of being and action, without
regard for their species, status, or sexualisexuali
ty.
Yin is passivity, yang is activity; yin
is space, and yang is surrounding fonn; yin
is receptive, and yang is contributive; yin
is fluid, and yang is its container.
In
Paleolithic symbolism, yin is the wotmd, and
yang is the spear.
In the emerging vocabuvocabu
lary of modern brain research, yin yang are
names for the right and left hemispheres of
the human brain. In all, male and female are
organizing principles applicable to a total
and integrated model of world reality.
Pre
Prerequisite to such integration is the need to
view things as they are:

Tao is great
Heaven is great
Earth is great
And the king [representing mankind] is
also great.
There are four great things in the uni
universe, and the king is one of them. [5]
The four great canpanents of reality are not
=rnpetitive but canplementary and imitative
of one another:
Man models himself after the Earth,

Earth models itself after Heaven,
Heaven models itself after Tao.
And Tao models itself after Nature. [6]

• the person Should be viewed as a
person and the world should be viewed as
the world. [9]

Taoism insists that relationships anong the
canponents of reality must be mutually cancan
plementary. Integrative processes within the
cyclic system of the universe are essential
to Taoism, but the relative status of its
various parts is inconsequential.

fbw, then, are things? What are the
genuine needs of an individual, a family, a
ccmnunity, and of the world? The answers to
these questions which are emerging fran the
ecological and ethological stOOies of the
past half-century have begun to sound sanesane
thing like the statements of Taoist PUla
pula-

Neither does the evolutionary chronology
of Taoist thought presuppose a status hierarhierar
chy based upon priority in time or a destiny
intended to glorify one canponent of reality
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SOPly.
Science appears to be a:mfirming the
implicit PlilosoPlies of Paleolithic art and
the ways of life camon arrong ancient and
lOCldern hunting peoples, not to mention the
patterns which govern the lives of many nonnon
human animals.
None of these deeply-rooted
traditions guarantees special rights to human
beings which contradict the rights of other
species or of the natural envirornnent.

ash is as essential as the ponderous pine
which will daninate a climax ecosystem on the
same site ten centuries later.
'lll.e first
PlilosoPler is as important as the m:>st rere
cent one.
Rights in ecosystems are functions of
the particular successional stage the system
has reached at any given time--that is,
rights are variable according to the candicandi
tion of the environment.
When rabbits are
abundant, lynx enjoy a right to rapid reprorepro
duction, which is later withdrawn when the
rabbit population declines.
'lll.e fireweed's
right to propagate its kind over new soil
disappears
when botanical su=ession has
restore a lIDre ccmplex vegetation on the
site.
On a larger time scale, the righ'.:s of
dinosaurs to evolve as a species was denied
by the environmental conditions of PleistoPleisto
cene glaciation.

Rights in such systems are based on
inherent natural characteristics which rere
quire expression and fulfillment.
Since
these characteristics are subject to change
according to time curl circumstance, rights
are necessarily as variable as the contexts
in which they are exercised.
Water
water on a
slope has a "right" to flow downhill, because
it is its nature to do so; water in a shelshel
tered pool has a right to quiescence, for the
same reason.
Rights are inherent in the
physics, the chemistry, the Plylogeny , the
anatany ~ the Plysiology, and the ecology of
things--in other ItfUrds, in their Tao.

tb individual organisms, and probably no
species, enjoy an inalienable right to live
when their ways of life are contrary to their
environmental circumstances.
Of the billion
or lIDre species which have existed at one
tiJre or other on the earth, only about one

In groups of natural things, the exerexer
cise of individual Tao is often canpetitive
with curl restrictive of other Tao.
Water's
water's
right to rtn1 downhill, for instance, treaI1S

percent nCM survive.
Those that do survive
earned their durability by adapting to envienvi
ronmental change, not because of their supesupe
rior status, and not because of their ability
to rranipulate environments for their own
welfare.

abridgement of the hill's right to retain its
contours, for it is eroded in the process.
Big fish deny the right to life of smaller
fish. Wind blows according to its stonrry Tao
curl prohibits water fran remaining placid
even in sheltered pools. When I1Ullti.ple funcfunc
tions exist, as they always do in ecosystems,
the rights of individual canponents I1UlSt be
subordinated to the requirements of the overover
all environment.
The rights of integrated
systems necessarily take priority over the
rights of individual ccrnponents, not because
systffilS have higher status, but because their
conditions of systemic balance are an aggreaggre
gate of their constituent organisms. 'lll.e Tao
of systems is collective.

The rights of non-human nature are not,
and never have been, uncertain, except in the
thoughts of humans.
They are canplex and
variable, but they are finnly established
upon the foundation of evolutionary history.
Natural rights are enforced by the biological
systems governing plant curl animal evolution
and distriOOtion and by the necessary correscorres
pondence between natural rights and their
environmental contexts.
'lll.e only species to
suffer genuine confusion about its rights is
our own.
We have lost confidence in our
instincts and have devised ways to contradict
and suppress them.
We lack sensitivi ty to
our environments, and we feel free to IOOdify
them to conform with our conceptual lOCldels of
reali ty.
We lack kncMledge of our rights as
a biological species, and of the responsibiresponsibi
lities which accanpany them.

Temporal order, too, has its own syssys
temic integrity.
'lll.e evolution of species
I1Ulst take precedence over the growth of indiindi
viduals, and the processes of succession in
ecosystems I1UlSt enjoy the right to proceed,
even to the abridgement of the rights of any
participating species. Evolution curl su=essu=es
sion are not status hierarchies, rot cyclic
temporal chronologies.
Early stages in both
are essential to the overall process, and the
fact that they may be "primitive" in fonn
does not lessen their importance.
'lll.e first
fireweed to grCM upon newly erupted volcanic
BElWEEN THE SPEX:IES

Human behavior can reasonably be tested
by asking whether specific acts or patterns
of behavior occur in non-human species as
well.
Acts which have sane counterpart in
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other an.im3.ls may be tentatively assumed to
enjoy a basic validity, possibly based upon a
cc.mtDI1
evolutionary history shared by humans
and by other animals which have evolved bebe
fore us and with us. Property and ownership,
for instance, seem to be important to many
territorial species.
Whether humans are a
territorial species,
however, remains in
doubt.
It is fXJSsible that our custans of
land Cffmership and the social systems built
upon these custans express ancient and inin
stinctual human patterns, or that they are
the COIlSe:JUences of an agricultural way of
life dating back only a few thousand years.
Territoriality can, perhaps, be understood
better when we know roore about its importance
to our near evolutionary neighbors, the other
primates, and roore about the anthropology of
our non-agricultural human ancestors. TerriTerri
torial rights reside in a grey area which has
not yet been ade:J\}ately explored.

food,

'!he right
however,

tionary history and the re:JUirerrents of envienvi
rornnental adaptation.
Does revenge behavior
enhance the prospects for our species 1 does
it help to fit us better into the world
ecosfhere?
Or is it, as seens roore likely,
an abberation of human mentality that serves
to estrange us fran one another and fran the
world around us?

sane forms of human behavior are so
blatantly out of step with natural patterns
of existence that no precedent whatsoever can
be found for them anywhere in natural hishis
tory.
Volcanoes may add lethal chemicals to
the atIrosfhere for brief periods, but they
cannot pretend to destroy as many forms of
life as the industrial pollution of the past
two centuries. No other species can systemasystema
tically destroy the other animal species
which compete with it or cause it nuisance.
No other species can extract quantities of
oil and minerals fran the lithosfhere, or add
poisons and wastes to it as ours can.
And
none save humans can overpop.liate the entire

to kill other animals for
is impossible to deny to any

carnivorous species.
Sane doubt may exist
that hLlma~s are naturally carnivorous, but,
the antiquity and universality of human hunhun
ting are sufficient to affirm that killing
animals of another species for food is a
basic behavioral pattern of hLllllanity, as
firmly established as the hunting rights of
bears or other ClIlU'livores.
When we kill for
purposes other than food, however, or when we
kill members of our Cffm species, then we are
on shaky ground.
Hunting for entertainment
or recreation is difficult to justify on
precedents fran other predatory species; the
killing of conspecifics by marder or warfare
is even roore rare; and killing for purposes
of revenge is virtually unknCffm apart fran
the abundant examples provided by human hishis
tory.
Only humans can visit the iniquities
of their fathers unto the sons of the third
or fourth generation.

world sufficiently to destroy species diverdiver
sity and to muddle the integrity of the enen
tire world ecosfhere.
Only in the past few
centuries have humans aaruired these dandan
gerous skills in actual fact, although the
enabling laws and ideologies fran which they
have grCffm are, perhaps, three or four thouthou
sand years old.
Humans cannot "bestow" rights upon nonnon
human nature any roore than men can prescribe
the rights appropriate to waren.
Models of
the world which as~ a status hierarchy
aroong =eatures of different kinds do viovio
lence to the rights of all =eatures, even to
those who have made a place for themselves at
the top. Yin and yang offer a roore pranising
concept of world order than top and bottom
have ever provided. Without sane such fhilofhilo
sofhy that is consistent with the natural
history of the world, the rights of humans
and non-humans alike will remain in jeopardy.
1he ethics governing our attitooes toward
nature govern also our relationships with
other human beings.

Behavior that is seemingly unique to our
species, such as revenge killing, re:JUires
detailed examination to determine whether it
is rooted in unique conditions attending the
evolutionary differentiation of humans fran
other animals, or if it rests upon p..rrely
intellectual models of realitv which lack any
biological basis. Clearly, revenge is possipossi
ble only for a species capable of l1lE!Il\Jry and
imagination.
It is, therefore, made availaavaila
ble to us arrvng the special functions of the
human brain.
'!he question, then, is whether
it is also a necessary and appropriate feafea
ture of our species in the light of evoluevolu

contlnued on page 50
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been featured in magazines, and helped develop courses of study.
I have seen people at

their stupidest and nnst intransigent, yet I
have also, en many occasions, seen the efficacy of reason and witnessed the tritnnP1 of
decency over self-interest.
In the midst of
all of this tumult, I have been fortunate,
indeed, to enjoy the security of a stable
hare life and have benefitted fran living
with a wife and son (born in 1979), both of
whan are considerably brighter than I am.
(By the time my wife, a matherratician, has
finished going over my papers and speeches
and rubbed my nose in every conceptual flaw,
I am IOClrally certain all my bases are covered
and am prepared to face anyone.) My little
boy has attended my speeches and lectures so
often that he has only to hear the word
"ethical" and he falls instantly aaleep.
When I gave the C. W. H~ Meirorial Lecture
at Kings College, London, in fact, he sat
erect in the first rCM, much to the amazement
of the audience, apparently absorbed in the
lecture, and slept quietly fran the first
sentence on, to be awakened only by the applause, in which he enthusiastically took
part.
For the i.rrrnediate future, I anticipate
working primarily on the treatment of animals
in science, not because there aren't other
areas of pressing concern, but because it is
the area I knCM best.
Then, too, despite
frequent lapses, scientists are professionally coumitted to abiding by the rule of reason
and are, thus, amenable to rational and scientific persuasion. Where profits and bottan
line are, as it were, the bottan line, as in
animal agriculture or in horse-racing, rational argument is obviously not the IOClst
effective force for change.
In addition to the all-import-...ant IOClral
dimension, it seems clear to me that the
issue of animal use in science teaches us
much about the nature of science. For if, as
scientists frequently say, contemporary bioIT¥3di.cine is essentially dependent on invasive
use of animals, surely they cannot also claim
as part of the ideology of science that science is value-free, since every such invasive
use of animals presupposes the m:>ral judgment
that the benefit gained by science is of
greater value than or trumps the animal pain
or suffering.
Also, the scientist's ability
to ignore the camon sense demands of IOClrality when dealing with laboratory animals is
itself a fascinating fhenanenon, based in
part upon a widespread notion integral to the

ideology of science that one can make no
judgments about animal feelings and awareness
and that imputatien of consciousness to animals is anthropaInqilic and scientifically
meaningless.
This in t.urn leads to bizarre
Cartesian claims that ani.mcls don't really
feel pain; they cnly "vocalize" or "ShCM
aversive behavior. n My nnst recent work is
designed to confute the orthodox view that
claims about animal minds are meaningless and
to ShCM that it was basically an indefensible
historical accident, inconsistent with fundamental biological premises, but pragmatically
expedient, which led to a denial of mentation
to animals.
In this way, I hope not only to
change the scientific gestalt on animal consciousness but to shed light on the less than
rational manner in which scientific change
takes place.
As the concept of local and public review of animal research gains credence, people will becc:ire increasingly aware, as, indeed, they have in the human research area,
that IOClral deliberations are not bull-sessions
and do not take place in a vacuum.
This, I
hope, will in turn ensure that the tissue of
questions surrounding these IOClral
issues
about animals will becane the object of serious study and research and, correlatively,
receives academic respectability and a place
for study in institutions of higher learning.
cnly in this way can such issues becane a
permanent and legitimate area of enIfhasis in
a democratic society.
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